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COMMENTS
The Edge of No-Man's Land-A Definition of the
Boundaries of State-Federal Jurisdiction Over
Labor Relations
The regulation of labor relations in the United States since
the enactment of the Wagner Act presents a history of expanded
federal and decreased state jurisdiction. The recent case of Guss
v. Utah Labor Relations Board' goes a step beyond prior juris-
1. 77 Sup. Ct. 598 (1957). Two other decisions, similar to and based upon the
Guss decision, were handed down the same day. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.
Fairlawn Meats, 77 Sup. Ct. 604 (1957) and San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon, 77 Sup. Ct. 607 (1957). In the Guss case, the Board had at first assumed
jurisdiction and then, upon amending its standards, declined to proceed further.
In the Amalgamated case, no effort was made to invoke the Board's jurisdiction,
but it was assumed that the Board would have declined jurisdiction over the
dispute. An effort was made to invoke the Board's jurisdiction in the San Diego
[1491
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XVIII
prudence in holding that a state may not regulate labor relations
which fall within the jurisdiction of the NLRB, although the
NLRB has declined to assert its jurisdiction. 2 The court based
its holding on a finding that Congress intended Section 10 (a)
of the Labor Management Relations Act to be the exclusive
means by which a state could regulate subject matter entrusted
to the Board. Section 10(a) provides that the Board may cede
jurisdiction to a state in certain cases if the state law is con-
sistent with the corresponding provision of the federal statute.3
Combined with the earlier action of the Board in raising its
standards of eligibility for Board jurisdiction, 4 the result of the
Guss case has been to create a vast no-man's land, free of regula-
tion, federal or state. A major purpose of this paper is to define
the edges of that no-man's land by tracing the boundaries of
state and federal action. Because the extent of federal power is
case, but the Board dismissed the petition, apparently because the size of the busi-
ness was too small to meet the jurisdictional standards.
2. The NLRB refused to proceed with the case because of a finding that the
business was predominantly local in character, as defined by its revised juris-
dictional standards. See NLRB Press Release of July 15, 1954 at 34 L.R.R.M.
75 (1954). The Court dealt with the case on the assumption that the Board's
refusal was for "budgetary or other reasons," but intimated that the refusal was
for policy reasons, which would bring the case more in line with Bethlehem Steel
Co. v. New York Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S. 767 (1947). That case invali-
dated state action on the grounds that the NLRB's refusal to certify foremen was
a federal policy action and that state certification conflicted with the federal
policy. The Bethlehem case specifically left open the question of how state powers
would be affected when the NLRB's refusal was for "budgetary or other reasons."
In Guss, the Court relied heavily on the Bethlehem case in determining congres-
sional intent behind Section 10(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act, which was enacted
shoftly after the Bethlehem decision. The Court's reasoning is open to attack
insofar as it said that because Congress was aware of the Bethlehem case it there-
fore understood NLRB jurisdiction to be exclusive, even in cases where the NLRB
had declined jurisdiction for budgetary or other reasons. In the first place, the
Bethlehem case merely decided that the state action in question conflicted with
federal policy action. Second, the opinion of the Court specifically declared that
the case did not decide the question of a declination of jurisdiction by the NLRB
for "budgetary or other reasons." "We cannot, therefore, deal with this as a case
where federal power has been delegated but lies dormant and unexercised." See
330 U.S. at 775. However, any defects in the reasoning of the Gu88 opinion were
cured by the Court's reliance on a Senate Committee Report which plainly implied
that Section 10(a) was the exclusive means by which a state might obtain juris-
diction over matters subject to the NLRB's jurisdiction. See 77 Sup. Ct. 598, 602
(1957) ; S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1947). An interesting attack
on the Gus8 case has been made by a Michigan court. See 40 L.R.R.M. 2616
(1957). The Michigan court refused to decline jurisdiction in the face of the Guss
case, on the grounds that in order to follow the Guss case, the court would have
to deprive the plaintiff of property without due process of law. The state court
pointed out that the Supreme Court had not passed upon this question in Guss,
and that therefore Guss was not controlling. Other state courts have acquiesced
in the Guss decision -i.e., Leathercraft Corp. v. Perry, 40 L.R.R.M. 2618 (1957).
3. The NLRB advised the Supreme Court in a brief amicus curiae that because
of the consistency proviso, it has been unable to consummate any cession agree-
ments with the states. 77 Sup. Ct. 598, 603 (1957).
4. Breeding Transfer Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 493 (1954) ; NLRB Press Release of
July 15, 1954 at 34 L.R.R.M. 75 (1954).
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well settled,5 the more important problem is the extent of state
jurisdiction. In view of the storm of dissatisfaction generated
by the Guss case,6 another purpose is to point out possible
changes in the boundary lines of state-federal jurisdiction.
Basic Principles
The Constitution grants Congress a plenary power to regu-
late interstate commerce,7 including the regulation of labor re-
lations affecting interstate Commerce." Whenever a conflict oc-
curs between the congressional regulation of interstate com-
merce and state action, the supremacy clause of the Constitution
causes the state law to fail.9 However, where there is no direct
conflict 10 or in a case where Congress has not exercised its
power," the question arises as to whether the federal power is
exclusive or concurrent. The answer rests in the intent of Con-
gress.12 When Congress is silent as to its intent, the courts will
determine whether the subject is national or local, and construe
the silence of Congress to require exclusive federal jurisdiction
over national subjects.' 3 An area is national in nature when it
requires uniform regulation. 4 An extension of this rule of
interpretation holds that when Congress has so occupied the field
as to require uniform regulation, the Congress intended its juris-
diction to be exclusive. 15 The application of these principles has
resulted in prompt reversals by Congress in cases where the
intent of Congress proved to be different from the intent at-
tributed to it by the Supreme Court.'6
5. Congressional power to regulate interstate commerce is plenary. Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). The NLRB's standards of eligibility for
jurisdiction are in precise terms of dollar volume of interstate inflow or outflow.
See note 4 supra.
6. Labor, management, state, and congressional leaders all agree on the need
to change the effect of the Guss case. See 40 L.R.R. 5, 193, 256, 291 (1957).
7. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
8. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
9. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
10. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
11. H. P. Hood & Sons Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
12. Cooley v. Port Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid. In the Cooley case the Court found that there was no need for uni-
formity and therefore the state bad concurrent authority.
15. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942).
16. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890), interpreted congressional intent so
as to conclude that the states had no power to regulate interstate liquor traffic.
Within a few months Congress promptly passed the Wilson Act, which reversed
the effect of the decision. See also Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431 (1936) (con-
gressional legislation reversed prior jurisprudence preventing state regulation of
interstate commerce in prison-made goods) ; Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin,
328 U.S. 408 (1946) (congressional legislation authorized states to regulate insur-
ance companies engaged in interstate commerce).
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The Effect of Congressional Regulation of Labor Relations
The Supreme Court has declared that the Wagner and Taft-
Hartley Acts have not removed the authority of the states to
restrain violence, 17 to regulate union security agreements, 8 and
to provide damages for tortious conduct. 9 It is less certain, but
presumably the states may also regulate harassing bargaining
tactics 2 and enforce collective bargaining agreements. 2' When-
ever state action would conflict with the federal statute22 or
where the subject is such that Congress intended the Board to
have exclusive jurisdiction, 23 the state has no power to act. The
earlier cases in which state action was declared invalid were
based on findings of conflicts with the federal law.24 But seeds
of judicial concern over the necessity of uniform regulation, as
expressed by way of dicta in cases which were decided on find-
ings that particular state action conflicted with the federal law, 25
blossomed into an application of preemption principles, which
attribute to Congress an intent to invest the Board with exclu-
sive jurisdiction over the subject matter it is empowered to
regulate.2
Permissible State Action
The first case dealing with the effect of the Wagner Act on
the power of a state to act in labor disputes affecting interstate
commerce recognized the power of a state to restrain violence.
2 7
The case dealt with mass picketing involving the threat or use
17. Allen-Bradley Local 1111 United Electrical Workers v. WERB, 315 U.S.
740 (1942).
18. Local 10, United Assn. of Journeymen Plumbers v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192
(1953) ; Algoma Plywood and Veneer Co. v. WERB, 336 U.S. 301 (1949).
19. United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp, 347 U.S.
656 (1954).
20. International Union, United Automobile Workers, AFL v. WERB, 336
U.S. 245 (1949), Mr. Justices Douglas, Black, Murphy and Rutledge dissenting.
21. But see Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 77 Sup. Ct. 912 (1957).
See text discussion to note 37 infra.
22. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
23. Garner v. Teamsters Union, AFL, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
24. Amalgamated Assn. of Street, Electric Ry. and Motor Coach Employees
v. WERB, 340 U.S. 383 (1951) ; International Union of United Automobile
Workers v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950) ; La Crosse Telephone Corp. v. WERB,
336 U.S. 18 (1949) ; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Labor Relations Board,
830 U.S. 767 (1947) ; Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
25. Amalgamated Assn. of Street, Electric Ry. and Motor Coach Employees v.
WERB, 340 U.S. 383, 389, 390 (1951) (dictum). Cf. Note, 11 LOUISIANA LAW
REvr1w 470 (1951) which contains an interesting note on the Motor Coach Em-
ployees case.
26. Garner v. Teamsters Union, AFL, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).




of force. The Court held that the use of violence was not among
the rights conferred or protected by the Wagner Act. Another
area in which state powers have not been abrogated is the regu-
lation of agreements requiring union membership as a condition
of employment. Section 14 (b) of the Taft-Hartley Act specifi-
cally declares that such union security agreements are not pro-
tected by the act when they are in violation of state laws. Prior
to the inclusion of this provision in the federal statute, the Su-
preme Court had reached the same result through an interpre-
tation of the Wagner Act. Section 8(3) of the Wagner Act
provided that discrimination in hiring and firing by an employer
due to compliance with a union security agreement was not an
unfair practice. Because such agreements were neither protected
nor prohibited by the act, the states could exercise jurisdiction. 8
In 1954, the court held that states may provide for recovery
of damages for tortious conduct because such action could not
conflict with the federal statute due to the fact that Congress
provided neither procedure nor remedy for tortious conduct.29
Although Section 303 of the Taft-Hartley Act provides for the
recovery of damages in federal courts for secondary boycott vio-
lations, the court reasoned that Congress did not intend to
abolish all common law rights. Citing the statutory language
"in any other court having jurisdiction of the parties," 30 the
Court suggested that even if the tortious conduct in question
were a secondary boycott, Section 303 (b) merely provided a uni-
form rule for recovery, consistent with either state or federal
jurisdiction. Congress must have intended by the inclusion of
such language that state courts should also have jurisdiction.
There is considerable doubt as to the power of the states to
regulate sit-downs, "quickie" strikes, slowdowns, and other con-
certed harassing tactics that fall short of a conventional strike.
The leading decision in this area, the Briggs-Stratton case, 81 holds
28. Algoma Plywood and Veneer Co. v. WERB, 336 U.S. 301 (1949). The case
arose before the Taft-Hartley Act was enacted, but was decided after the passage
of the act.
29. United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S.
656 (1954).
30. Section 303(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act reads: "Whoever shall be in-jured in his business or property by reason of any violation of Subsection (a)
may sue therefor in any district court of the United States subject to the limita-
tions and provisions of section 301 hereof without respect to the amount in con-
troversy, or in any other court having jurisdiction of the parties, and shall recover
the damages by him sustained and the cost of suit." (Emphasis added.)
31. International Union, United Automobile Workers, AFL v. WERB, 336
U.S. 245 (1949), Mr. Justices Douglas, Black, Murphy, and Rutledge dissenting.
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that the states may "mark the limits of tolerable industrial con-
flict in the public interest," a statement that seems inconsistent
with other statements by the Court.3 2 In the Briggs-Stratton
case, Wisconsin's action in granting a cease and desist order
against frequent, unscheduled union meetings during working
hours was upheld by the United States Supreme Court on the
ground that the activity was neither protected nor prohibited by
the federal act. "Congress designedly left open an area for state
control" and the "intention of Congress to exclude States from
exercising their police power must be clearly manifested." 33 The
Court arrived at this conclusion in the face of express language
in the federal statute which clearly called for an opposite result.
Section 7 of the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts protects the em-
ployees' right to engage in concerted activity for the purpose of
collective bargaining. The right to strike, protected by Section
13, was interpreted as meaning the right to legally strike and
the Court then presumed that the states could determine the
legality of the strike or strike methods. This was done even
though the language of Section 501 (2) defines the word "strike"
as including "any concerted slow-down or other concerted inter-
ruption of operations by employees." (Emphasis added.) The
majority opinion circumvented this statutory language by de-
claring that Section 13 did not modify existing law as to the
right to strike, but was merely placed in the statute to insure
that the interpretation of the statute would not modify whatever
right to strike might exist under other laws. Nothing in the leg-
islative history was cited to support this opinion, except for a
footnote quotation of a House Conference Report which accom-
panied the bill.3 4 The report stated in substance that Section 7's
protection of "concerted activities" did not extend to unlawful
and improper concerted activities, but all of the references to
such activities dealt with unlawful activities as determined by
the NLRB, not as determined by state authority. Furthermore,
the report made no reference to Sections 13 and 501(2), the
language of which was directly in point and could not have been
weakened by the contents of the report. The validity of the
opinion is also questionable in that the conduct involved occurred
32. Id. at 253. But see International Union of United Automobile Workers
v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454, 457 (1950) (dictum) : "Congress occupied this field
and closed it to state regulation." See also Amalgamated Assn. of Street, Electric
Ry. and Motor Coach Employees v. WERB, 340 U.S. 383, 389, 390 (1951).
33. 336 U.S. 245, 253 (1949), quoting Allen-Bradley Local 1111, United Elec-
trical Workers v. WERB, 315 U.S. 740, 749, 750 (1942).
34. Id. at 260.
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before enactment of the Taft-Hartley amendments, which con-
ceivably may have made the conduct a failure to bargain in good
faith on the part of the union and subject to the exclusive juris-
diction of the Board under the Taft-Hartley Act. However, the
Court stated that its opinion was based upon both the Wagner
Act and the 1947 amendments, but it did not really consider the
construction of the preceding sentence. In view of the closeness
of the decision, 35 its logical fallacies and its inconsistency with
the line of jurisprudence that places such great emphasis on the
necessity of uniform regulation of labor disputes affecting inter-
state commerce, one would think that the case would have been
overturned by now. However, in a case which presented such
an opportunity, the Court at first granted and then withdrew
certiorari.3 Thus, doubts concerning the present validity of the
decision are unresolved.
An area in which some states have regulated labor relations
may have been preempted by a recent decision of the Supreme
Court, which held that Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, pro-
viding federal enforcement of collective bargaining contracts,
creates federal substantive law.37 The case involved an agree-
ment to arbitrate. Having held that such an arbitration agree-
ment is substantive federal law, the next logical step would be
for the Court to declare that Congress has occupied the field for
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements, and that the
states have no power to act therein. Due to the emphasis the
jurisprudence has placed on the necessity of uniform labor laws,
it would seem that there is reason to conclude that Congress in-
tended the federal jurisdiction to be exclusive. At least one state
court has rejected this argument against its enforcement of a
collective bargaining agreement.38 Thus, until such time as the
question is resolved by the federal courts, the states will very
likely continue to consider the area as subject to state jurisdic-
tion.
An interesting procedural problem has been handled by the
Supreme Court in such a way that, while those state actions
which have been preempted or which are in conflict with the
35. Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge dissented.
36. Textile Workers Union v. NLRB, 227 F.2d 409 (D.C. Cir. 1955), certiorari
granted, 350 U.S. 1004 (1956), and later denied, 352 U.S. 864 (1956).
37. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 77 Sup. Ct. 912 (1957).
38. The New York Supreme Court has rejected the argument that the Lincoln
Mills case meant that enforcement of collective bargaining contracts was pre-
empted by Congress. In re Steinberg, 40 L.R.R.M. 2619 (1957).
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federal law may be ultimately declared invalid, the state none-
theless can effectively, though perhaps illegally, take action. The
Court has held that private parties cannot file actions in federal
courts to have illegal state action enjoined. 9 Only the NLRB
may file such an action, and if it chooses not to do so, the af-
fected private litigants must follow the normal, time-consuming
appeal channels to have the state action declared invalid in the
federal courts. In many labor disputes where time is of the
essence, immediate access to the federal courts is necessary as
in the case of a state injunction against striking. Once the strike
is broken, there is very little real relief that can be given on
appeal by dissolving an injunction which has already achieved
its purpose.
40
State Action Invalidated Due to Conflict with the
Federal Statute
In 1945, the provisions 41 of the Wagner Act which protected
employees' rights to collective bargaining were interpreted as
protecting these rights from interference by state governments.
A state statute imposing requirements upon collective bargain-
ing agents which carried the sanction of loss of status as bar-
gaining representative was held to be an interference with the
"full freedom" guaranteed by the Wagner Act in the selection
of bargaining representatives.4 2 State powers were curtailed
even further by the 1947 Bethlehem Steel case.48 The NLRB had
refused to certify foremen as a bargaining unit or to exercise
jurisdiction over them. The Supreme Court in effect considered
this negative act as federal action. State action to the contrary
in certifying a bargaining unit of foremen conflicted With the
federal policy, thereby invalidating the state action. The 1949
case of Lacrosse v. Wisconsin44 held that the state lacked juris-
diction even when the conflict with federal action was only po-
tential. The Wisconsin statute provided a method of certifying
craft bargaining units, whereas the federal statute left the mat-
ter to the discretion of the NLRB. Therefore, if the NLRB had
39. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Brothers Co., 348 U.S. 511
(1955).
40. This was pointed out in a strong dissent by Justice Douglas, Chief Justice
Warren and Justice Black concurring in the dissent. Id. at 524.
41. 49 Stat. 449, § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1935).
42. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
43. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S.
767 (1947).
44. 336 U.S. 18 (1949).
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jurisdiction, but had neither exercised nor refused to exercise
it, there was nevertheless a potential conflict with federal regu-
lation that would preclude state intervention. A 1950 case45 indi-
cated by way of dicta that Congress had so fully occupied the
field of peaceful strikes and picketing that all state action was
preempted, but the case really turned on a conflict between the
state and federal provisions.
In cases where the Board has refused to prohibit an alleged
unfair labor practice by finding that the facts did not constitute
an unfair practice under the federal statute, a state may not act 46
because the subject matter of collective bargaining falls under
the protection clause of the federal statute when there are no
express prohibitory provisions.47 Section 7 of the Taft-Hartley
Act protects the right of employees to engage in concerted ac-
tivities for the purpose of collective bargaining. It makes no
difference that the state action is on grounds not specifically
or directly intended to affect labor disputes, such as the viola-
tion of a restraint of trade statute.48 Except in cases of violence, 49
it does not matter how great the interest of the state may be,
nor how seriously endangered the welfare of its people may be.5
By way of dicta in a case involving intervention in a labor dis-
pute that threatened the interruption of vital public utility serv-
ice, the Court stated that Congress intended that the jurisdic-
ion of the Board should be exclusive in disputes affecting inter-
state commerce.5' But the case actually turned on a finding
that the state action conflicted with the federally protected
right to strike.52
State Action Invalidated on Ground of Exclusive Federal
Jurisdiction
In much of the jurisprudence commented upon above there
ran a vein of judicial feeling that the regulation of labor dis-
putes affecting interstate commerce is an area in which uniform
45. International Union of United Automobile Workers v. O'Brien, 339 U.S.
454 (1950).
46. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
47. Id. :at 478-80; United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351
U.S. 62 (.1956).
48. Id.: -at 480.
49. Allen-Bradley Local 1111, United Electrical Workers v. WERB, 315 U.S.
740 (1942).
50. See Amalgamated Assn. of Street, Electric Railway and Motor Coach Em-
ployees v. WERB, 340 U.S. 383 (1951).
51. Id. at 389-90.
52. Id. -at .398-99.
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regulation is required. In some of the cases wherein state action
was invalidated on findings of conflict with the federal statute,
the Court, by way of dicta, declared that Congress intended to
occupy the field exclusively. 53 Therefore, the 1951 case of Gar-
ner v. Teamsters Union54 should have come as no surprise. The
state statute was identical to the Labor Management Relations
Act, precluding all possibility of finding a conflict in the substan-
tive rules of law. The Court squarely held, for the first time, that
Congress intended to vest the Board with exclusive jurisdiction
over the subject matter entrusted to it by the Labor Management
Relations Act. The Court reasoned that the diversity of tri-
bunals attendant upon allowing a state to exercise concurrent
jurisdiction would lead to a lack of uniformity and potential con-
flict, and that Congress could not have intended such a result.
The Garner holding was strengthened by a later case in which
it was held that the mere allegation that a federal right has been
violated automatically deprives a state court of jurisdiction.55
Guss v. Utah has extended the principle of exclusive federal
jurisdiction even further, in that it holds that a state may not
act even when the Board's jurisdiction is dormant and unexer-
cised for budgetary or other reasons, except insofar as the Board
may cede jurisdiction to the states under Section 10(a). Be-
cause Guss extends the principle established by Garner, one
might think that the court would have relied upon Garner in its
rationale of the Guss decision. However, the decision was based
not upon Garner, but upon an interpretation of the legislative
history of Section 10 (a), which led to the conclusion that Section
10(a) 's provision, authorizing the Board to cede jurisdiction in
certain cases to states when state law is consistent with ap-
plicable federal provisions, is the exclusive means by which
states may exercise jurisdiction over subject matter entrusted
to the NLRB. 56
The Boundaries as Defined by the Jurisprudence
In summarizing the jurisprudence, a definition of the boun-
aries of federal and state jurisdiction is possible. Permissible
53. The most notable example was contained in International Union of United
Automobile Workers v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454, 457 (1950), wherein it was said
"Congress occupied this field and closed it to state regulation." See also Amalga-
mated Assn. of Street, Electric Ry. and Motor Coach Employees v. WERB, 340
U.S. 383, 390 (1951).
54. 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
55. Local 25, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. New York, N.H. &
H.R.R., 350 U.S. 155 (1956) (allegation in state court that Taft-Hartley Act
was violated deprives state of jurisdiction).
56. See note 2 supra, which contains an analysis of the Court's rationale.
[Vol. XVIII
COMMENTS
state action goes as far as intervention in violence, the regula-
tion of union security agreements, and the provision of remedies
for tortious conduct. The state line may also extend as far as
the enforcement of collective bargaining contracts and interven-
tion in the use of harassing or unfair bargaining tactics. But
this is less certain. The federal boundary, although Congress
may change it at will, has two limits. One is the self-imposed
jurisdictional standards of the NLRB and prevents federal
action. Another limit arises at the point where the NLRB is
empowered by the Taft-Hartley Act to exercise jurisdiction.
This is the point where federal jurisdiction meets the state line
and state action is excluded. Between the two federal lines there
is a no-man's land, free of all regulation.
Filling the Gap
All who have expressed themselves agree that the gap should
be filled.57 Proposed solutions follow two lines. One approach
is that the Board can and should rectify the situation. Another
method would have Congress handle the problem.
A solution by board action. Lawyers of the AFL-CIO have
proposed that the solution should rest with the Board.58 They
point out that the Board could substantially fill the gap by low-
ering its jurisdictional requirements to include smaller enter-
prises and by giving a broader interpretation to the consistency
proviso of Section 10(a). It is submitted that this approach is
neither as workable nor as complete as would be a solution
through congressional action. It is doubtful that the Board will
or should revise its standards downward to the full extent of the
commerce power. There will always be businesses so small or
local in character as to dissuade the NLRB from including them
in its jurisdictional standards for budgetary or administrative
considerations. 59 In view of the restricted manner in which the
Court has treated Section 10 (a) and the general tendency of the
jurisprudence to deny jurisdiction to a state in the interest of
uniformity, it is doubtful that the Court would sustain a liberal
interpretation by the Board as to whether a state statute is con-
57. Labor, management, state and Congressional leaders all agree on the need
to change the effect of the Gus8 case. See 40 L.R.R. 5, 193, 256, 291 (1957).
58. 40:L.R.R. 6 (1957).
59. Chairman Boyd Leedom testified at a recent hearing on the Ayres Bill
that the Board has never exercised the full extent of its jurisdiction. The House
Labor Subcommittee intimated that there might be legislation introduced to require
the Board to exercise its full jurisdiction. See 40 L.R.R. 291 (1957). However,
this is highly speculative.
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sistent with the federal provisions. However, as a stop-gap
measure, it would seem that the AFL-CIO proposal would be a
desirable palliative until Congress can appraise and cope with
the problem. At a recent congressional hearing, Chairman Boyd
Leedom of the NLRB indicated that the Board might take such
action if Congress does not act promptly.60
Proposed solutions by Congress. Several proposals are await-
ing congressional action. The United States Chamber of Com-
merce suggests that Congress should enact a blanket declara-
tion of intent to the effect that no congressional act should be
interpreted as superseding state laws, unless such intent is ex-
pressly stated.61 Congressman Smith of Virginia has sponsored
a bill along these lines,02 which has been opposed by the Justice
Department. 3 Another bill, by Congressman Ayres of Ohio,
would amend the Taft-Hartley Act so as to permit states to as-
sume jurisdiction over disputes over which the NLRB would
decline to exercise jurisdiction.6 4 Senator Watkins of Utah has
sponsored a proposal to amend the Administrative Procedure
Act to give states jurisdiction where any federal agency declines
to act.6 5 The Watkins and Ayres Bills would clear up any doubts
as to the authority of the Board to decline to assert jurisdiction
by specifically granting such powers when, in the agency's opin-
ion, the effect on interstate commerce is not sufficient to war-
rant the exercise of federal jurisdiction. Senator Ives of New
York would also authorize the Board to decline jurisdiction, and
grant jurisdiction to the states automatically in such cases.66
But the Ives Bill would go a step further, in that it would allow
the Board to make cession agreements with the states even where
interstate commerce is substantially affected, presumably in
areas where the Board might also retain concurrent jurisdiction.
The cession provision would repeal the present restrictions of
Section 10(a) and makes no mention of any necessity of con-
sistency between state and federal laws. The Ives Bill is in the
form of an amendment to the Taft-Hartley Act.
60. Ibid.
61. Id. at 292.
62. H.R. 3, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957). The bill was inspired by the use of
the preemption doctrine in a sedition case. However, its provisions would apply to
all types of situations in which the courts might have occasion to determine
whether the Congress intended to exercise concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction. It
would create a presumption that in the absence of an express declaration of intent,
concurrent jurisdiction was intended.
63. See 40 L.R.R. 7 (1957).
64. H.R. 6432, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
65. S. 1933, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).




It is submitted that a synthesis of the Ives and Watkins Bills
would be the better solution of the problem. By casting legisla-
tion in the form of an amendment to the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, gaps in other areas of administrative law would be
prevented. The Ives proposal to allow the Board to cede juris-
diction to the states even where commerce is substantially af-
fected would do away with the one-sided emphasis on the de-
sirability of uniform regulation and recognize that there are
sometimes considerations of far greater importance than the
effect on interstate commerce. The "effect on commerce" ap-
proach to the finding of congressional intent has lacked balance
in that it has failed to give adequate attention to the degree to
which local or state interests are impaired. The complexities of
labor relations and other matters entrusted to administrative
agencies because of the need for flexible administration war-
rant administrative determination of whether a specific subject
is primarily of national or local concern. Reasonable standards
could be formulated to avoid the anomalous conditions resulting
from judicial interpretation of legislative intent.67
Because of the political problems and delays involved in con-
gressional action, it should be recognized that the probabilities
of amending either the Taft-Hartley Act or the Administrative
Procedure Act in the near future are not great. Therefore, the
NLRB should provide a temporary solution by lowering its juris-
dictional standards and attempting to enter into cession agree-
ments with the states.
Fred W. Ellis
67. Treatment of the problem through the interpretation of Congressional in-
tent, when Congress in fact could not have thought of the multitude of situations
that may arise, has led to some odd results which suggest that proper recognition
of legitimate state interests has been absent. The Court has found that Congress
has "intended" that a state may act against minor physical violence in labor dis-
putes affecting commerce. Allen-Bradley Local 1111, United Electrical Workers v.
WERB, 315 U.S. 740 (1942). But yet Congress did not "intend" that a state may
act in a dispute that threatened to stop vital public utility service affecting the
health and welfare of a large segment of its population. Amalgamated Assn. of
Street, Electric Ry. and Motor Coach Employees v. WERB, 340 U.S. 383 (1951).
The degree to which interstate commerce is affected may be the same in both
eases.
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